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Abstract: This paper aims at a nor-
mative account of non-deductive 
argumentation schemes in the spirit 
of Hamblin’s dialectical philosophy. 
First, three principles are presented 
that characterize Hamblin’s dialecti-
cal stance. Second, argumentation 
schemes, which have hardly been 
examined in Hamblin’s book Falla-
cies, shall be dealt with by applying 
these principles, taking an argumen-
tation scheme from authority as the 
leading example. Third, a formal 
dialectical system, along the lines 
indicated by Hamblin, shall be de-
veloped that includes norms for us-
ing argumentation schemes and 
norms for responding to arguments 
that are presented as instantiating 
acceptable argumentation schemes.  
 
Résumé:  Ce document vise à dé-
crire des schèmes normatifs de 
l’argumentation non-déductive dans 
l'esprit de la philosophie dialectique 
de Hamblin. D'abord, je présente 
trois principes qui caractérisent la 
position dialectique de Hamblin. 
Deuxièmement, j’applique ces prin-
cipes aux schèmes d'argumentation, 
qui n'ont guère été examinés dans 
Fallacies, le livre de Hamblin, en 
prenant un schème d'argumentation 
d'autorité comme le meilleur exem-
ple. Troisièmement, j’élabore un 
système formel dialectique, dans le 
sens indiqué par Hamblin, qui com-
prend des normes pour utiliser des 
schèmes d'argumentation et des 
normes pour répondre aux argu-
ments présentés comme l'instancia-
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1.  Introduction  
 
From a dialectical perspective, argumentation theory can be 
conceived of as the study of how participants in a dialogue do 
and should act with the aim of solving their self-defined prob-
lems or differences by balancing considerations pro and con, so 
that the result is based upon their own conceptions of the merits 
of the case (cf. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004; cf. Walton 
1998). By expounding his philosophy of argument in his 
ground-breaking book Fallacies (Hamblin 1970), Hamblin has 
been one of the originators of the kind of argumentation theory 
according to which dialogue participants need not rely on exter-
nal norms, but control each dialogue themselves.  
This paper deals with non-deductive argumentation 
schemes (Garssen 2001; Hitchcock 2010; Kienpointner 1992; 
Wagemans 2011; Walton, Reed and Macagno 2008), and it aims 
at a normative account of them in the spirit of Hamblin’s dialec-
tical philosophy. First, three principles are presented that charac-
terize Hamblin’s dialectical stance (Section 2). Next, I shall ex-
amine how argumentation schemes, which have hardly been ex-
amined in Hamblin’s book, can be dealt with from such a per-
spective by applying these principles to arguments that are put 
forward with the pretence of instantiating an acceptable argu-
mentation scheme, taking an argumentation scheme from au-
thority as the leading example (Section 3). Finally, I shall indi-
cate how a formal dialectical system, along the lines indicated 
by Hamblin, can be developed that includes norms for using ar-
gumentation schemes and norms for responding to arguments 




2.  Hamblin’s dialectical perspective 
 
First, Hamblin’s dialectical philosophy can be characterized by, 
what he labeled, “the Dialectical Theory of Logical Form, or, 
perhaps, the Dialectical Theory of Meaning” (pp. 285-6). I shall 
refer to this theory as the Dialectical Meaning Principle:  
 
all properties of linguistic entities are … determinable 
from the broad pattern of their use (p. 285).  
 
Hamblin seems to apply this principle at three occasions at least. 
(a) When dealing with equivocation, the meaning of non-logical 
expressions is not to be seen as given in advance of the dialogue, 
but rather as determinable from the ways in which the expres-
sions are used within the dialogue, among which the ways in 
which the expressions’ meanings are molded with clarifying re-
marks. To elaborate on his example, the meaning of “locate” can 
be deciphered by examining what statements, containing that 
term, have been accepted or rejected, and, in special situations, 
by examining how the term at hand has been charged as equivo-
cal—“your argument is based on a shift in the meaning of ‘lo-
cate’” —, or how such a charge is responded to—“at all occur-
rences, I have used the term as meaning the same as ‘decide 
where to put x’” (Hamblin 1970, Chapter 9). (b) A different kind 
of application of this Dialectical Meaning Principle can be found 
in Hamblin’s discussion on the various kinds of locution (speech 
acts) that are needed within a dialogue. According to Hamblin, 
the so-called “syntactical rules” (p. 259, p. 269) of the dialogue 
provide the various types of locution with their meaning. To use 
one of his examples, a question “P or Q?” is the type of locution 
that is followed by the assertion “P”, or by the assertion “Q,” or 
by the expression of non-commitment to the disjunction of P 
and Q, or by the denial of the disjunction of P and Q, or by ex-
pression of non-commitment to both P and Q (p. 266). These 
rules provide the meaning of this kind of question.
1
 A discussion 
about the meaning of the locution type of “assertion” prompts 
Hamblin to state his Dialectical Meaning Principle (p. 284-286). 
(c) According to Hamblin, a logically deductive scheme, such as 
modus ponens, is primarily a dialectical procedure (pp. 299-
300), which suggests that its meaning is exhausted by a set of 
procedural, dialogical rules. 
 How could we apply the Dialectical Meaning Principle 
when developing a normative model of argumentation schemes? 
According to the principle, an argumentation scheme must be 
seen as provided with its meaning, either by the way participants 
actually use argumentation schemes (as in application (a) 
above), or by rules that govern the use of argumentation 
schemes within a dialogue (as in applications (b) and (c)). When 
aiming at a prescriptive formal system, argumentation schemes 
must be defined by formulating the general preconditions and 
postconditions that govern the speech acts that are employed 
when using the argumentation schemes (such as putting forward 
an argument that instantiates a particular argumentation 
scheme), or when responding to a speech act in which it has 
been used (such as critically reacting to the connection between 
the premises and the conclusion of an argument that instantiates 
an argumentation scheme). As far as a particular scheme is con-
cerned, for example a particular argumentation scheme from au-
thority, its meaning is also to be given by the specific procedural 
rules that make this argumentation scheme stand apart from oth-
er argumentation schemes. An example of such a rule would be 
one that enables the receiving party to critically react towards a 
kind of premise that is characteristic of the argumentation 
scheme at hand, such as the proposition that the source appealed 
to in the argument really is an expert in the field. Argumentation 
schemes, then, are different in so far as different preconditions 
or postconditions obtain.  
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 Hamblin contrasts syntactical rules with “discretionary rules,” which aim at 
improving the quality of the dialogue, and do not define speech acts. 
 Second, Hamblin’s dialectical philosophy can be charac-
terized by his view on the evaluation of arguments. It is stressed 
by Hamblin at various occasions that the decision on whether an 
argument is “good” is in the end up to the participants them-
selves. We can label this view as his Dialectical Evaluation 
Principle:  
 
The evaluation of arguments and of other dialogical contri-
butions is to be left to the participants.  
 
Hamblin’s view on the role of the logician gives evidence of his 
acceptance of this principle. About this role, he writes: 
 
The logician does not stand above and outside practical ar-
gumentation or, necessarily, pass judgement on it. He is not 
a court of appeal, and there is no such judge or court: he is, 
at best, a trained advocate. It follows that it is not the logi-
cian’s particular job to declare the truth of any statement, or 
the validity of any argument (italics in original, p. 244). 
 
The task of a logician, or an argumentation theorist for that mat-
ter, is to develop the devices with which the participants in an 
argumentative dialogue can themselves solve the differences and 
problems that they encounter, and to place these devices at their 
disposal. Accordingly, arguments should not be evaluated on the 
basis of norms that are external to the dialogue at hand. 
 One consequence of the Dialectical Evaluation Principle is 
stated explicitly by Hamblin, to wit that the decision whether the 
connection between the argument’s premises and conclusion, 
or—as he names it—the passage from premises to conclusion, is 
“good” is, in the end, up to the participants themselves. When 
Hamblin discusses the dialectical criteria for good arguments, he 
states just one criterion that deals with this connection. I shall 
refer to this criterion as the Justificatory Force Principle, and 
consider this to be a consequence of the Dialectical Evaluation 
Principle :  
 
The passage from premisses to conclusion must be of an ac-
cepted kind (italics in original, p. 245).  
 
This Justificatory Force Principle becomes apparent at a number 
of places. Above, we have already seen that Hamblin conceives 
of a deductively valid argument form, such as modus ponens, as 
a dialectical procedure, which suggests that the procedure can be 
adopted or rejected, so that whether a particular argument is to 
be treated as a deductively valid argument is, in part, a conse-
quence of a previous choice. The emphasis on acceptance fur-
ther becomes clear when discussing the situation where a recipi-
ent happens to accept a particular form of reasoning as deduc-
tively valid, and where he further acknowledges that a particular 
argument with acceptable premises instantiates that form of rea-
soning, but where she nevertheless does not want to accept that 
argument’s conclusion. Even in such situations, there exists an 
“virtually ad infinitum” (p. 252) number of escape routes for the 
recipient of this argument. She may point out an equivocation, 
or take the argument to be question begging, or consider the ar-
gument insufficiently translucent, or raise a counterargument 
(pp. 251-252), and so forth.
2
 Thus, even deductive arguments 
are only knock-down arguments, in Hamblin’s view, if they are 
accepted by the participants as such.  
 How can we follow a similar course when dealing with 
arguments that aspire to instantiate an acceptable argumentation 
scheme? One consequence of Hamblin’s dialectical perspective 
seems to be that the dialogue participants themselves must be 
seen as being in the position to choose the argumentation 
schemes they consider appropriate, and that they have the pro-
cedures at their disposal with which to determine whether a par-
ticular argument satisfies their standards. In other words: in the 
end, it is up to the participants what argumentation schemes to 
adopt as prima facie acceptable, and how to determine whether a 
particular argument fulfills self-chosen requirements.
3
 In a dif-
ferent, but related context of dealing with fallacy-mongers, 
Hamblin writes: “The control of each dialogue is in the hands of 
the participants themselves” (p. 283). 
 
 
3.  A dialectical theory of argumentation schemes 
In this section, I shall elaborate on how argumentation schemes 
can be incorporated in a dialogue theory, in line with Hamblin’s 
dialectical principles. The following questions shall be dealt 
with: How can we define “argumentation scheme”?; What are 
the options for the participants when choosing their preferred 
                                                 
2
 Hamblin’s view seems to be that the passage of the argument is not lacking 
goodness merely as a result of the recipient’s refraining her consent to the 
passage from premises to conclusion. Instead, the idea seems to be that an 
argument is a failure to the extent that the recipient of the argument offers a 
relevant counterconsideration against the passage. There must be a ‘good 
reason’ for not accepting the passage, a requirement which, of course, can 
only be negotiated within the confines of the dialogue, given the dialectical 
perspective. 
3
 What remains for argumentation theorists? In line with Hamblin’s view, the 
argumentation theorist’s task would be to assist dialogue participants to make 
these choices, for example by developing useful concepts, and dialogical sys-
tems or procedures. 
argumentation schemes?; How can they use argumentation 
schemes in order to interpret and reconstruct arguments?; How 
can the proponent profit from employing an argumentation 
scheme that has been adopted?; How can the participants deter-





3.1 Defining “argumentation scheme” 
 
I conceive of an argumentation scheme as a scheme of reason-
ing, containing a number of variables, that involves particular 
(conditional) obligations in a dialogue in which the scheme has 
been adopted by the participants. If an opponent has adopted a 
particular argumentation scheme as acceptable, and if she has 
been offered an argument that clearly instantiates that scheme, 
she must be considered as under the obligation to commit her-
self to the standpoint (or conclusion) of that argument as soon as 
she has committed herself to the reasons (or premises) of that 
argument, be it that this commitment to the standpoint is can-
celled if the opponent puts forward a counterconsideration that 
cannot be successfully refuted by the proponent. An adopted 
argumentation scheme is an argumentation scheme that has ac-
tually been adopted by the dialogue participants. That an argu-
mentation scheme has been adopted implies that, according to 
the discussants, the scheme is not a deductively valid scheme, 
but that it exhibits a justificatory force that is sufficiently strong, 
so that each instance has premises that suffice, in non-excepting 
circumstances, for the conclusion. A commonly adopted argu-
mentation scheme is an argumentation scheme that is frequently 
adopted within a particular community, or within a particular 
class of dialogues.  
Though not always (Hitchcock 2010, p. 157), the notion of 
an argumentation scheme (or argument scheme) is often defined 
as a commonly adopted framework of argument (Van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst 1992, p. 96; Garssen 2001, p. 96; Walton, 
Reed and Macagno 2008, p. 1). In order to get a clear view on 
the nature and role of argumentation within a particular setting, 
such as for instance a political deliberation, it is useful to make 
use of a notion of commonly adopted argumentation schemes. 
However, we also need to be able to examine patterns of reason-
ing that resemble common argumentation schemes in all re-
spects except for being common, in order to be able to describe 
discussants as having adopted argumentation schemes that are 
not common but, in their view, worthy of acceptance.  
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 An exposition of the ideas in Section 3 can also be found in Van Laar 
(2012) and in Van Laar and Krabbe (2012) . 
  
3.2 Choosing argumentation schemes 
 
In order to control the dialogue, the participants themselves 
must choose the argumentation schemes they consider pertinent 
to resolving their differences, as well as specify the details of 
those schemes, in some situations regardless of whether the 
adopted schemes or the adopted specifications of schemes are 
frequently adopted ones. For example, they could choose to 
adopt an argumentation scheme From Expert Opinion (cf. Wal-
ton, Reed and Macagno 2008, p. 310) as acceptable, and specify 
the preferred version as in Scheme 1:  
 
Person E is an expert in field F; Person E says that P; P is 
a proposition within field F; Therefore P.  
 
But then, they could specify more or less the same idea in a 
somewhat different manner, leading to Scheme 2,  
 
Person E is an expert in field F; Person E says that P; P is 
a proposition within field F; Person E is unbiased with re-
spect to P; Therefore P. 
 
Or, they could even adopt Scheme 3:  
 
Person E is an expert in field F; Person E says that P; P is 
a proposition within field F; Person E is unbiased with re-
spect to P; Person E has always shown to be reliable as far 
as propositions in field F are concerned; Therefore P. 
 
Argumentation schemes can be considered for adoption within a 
preliminary stage of the dialogue, such as the opening stage of a 
critical discussion (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, Chap-
ter 3). Particular argumentation schemes can be considered as 
appropriate, or inappropriate for that matter, within a particular 
class of dialogues, such as those that are performed within more 
or less institutionalized “argumentative activity types” (van 
Eemeren and Houtlosser 2005). For example, schemes that un-
derlie personal attacks are prima facie acceptable in many types 
of political debate, while hardly so within scholarly meetings 
between experts. The choice to enter a particular type of dia-
logue can be considered to imply a choice to commit oneself to 
the argumentation schemes that go with that kind of dialogue. 
For the purpose of specifying dialogue rules for the use of 
argumentation schemes, I shall assume that choices about what 
argumentation schemes to adopt have been made in a prelimi-
nary stage, and that it is clear to the participants what argumen-
tation schemes have been adopted. Different choices lead to dif-
ferent rights and obligations. These will be discussed in the sub-
sections below, in preparation of the system to be developed in 
Section 4. 
 
3.3 Reconstructing arguments in the light of the adopted argu-
mentation schemes 
 
An argument that is presented by the proponent as instantiating 
a particular adopted argumentation scheme will be interpreted 
and reconstructed in the light of that argumentation scheme. 
Thus, after having adopted Scheme 2 or Scheme 3, rather than 
Scheme 1, an argument “Erwin says that it is going to rain to-
night, so, probably, it is going to rain tonight”, can be recon-
structed as containing the unexpressed premise to the effect that 
Erwin is unbiased with respect to the proposition that it is going 
to rain tonight. 
In addition, the passage from premises to conclusion gets a 
particular content, as a result of the choice for a particular argu-
mentation scheme. I assume that this passage can be considered 
as the substance of a separate premise that remains often, but not 
always, implicit: the so-called connection premise (Walton and 
Krabbe 1995, p. 128). The connection premise is a conditional 
statement, having the conjunction of the other premises as its 
antecedent and the standpoint as its consequent. It expresses that 
the passage between the argument’s premises and its conclusion 
is acceptable within the context at hand. The practical message 
of the connection premise is that the opponent’s commitment to 
the set of (explicit and implicit) regular premises entails, within 
the situation at hand, a commitment to the conclusion. After 
having adopted Scheme 1, the connection premise reads “If Er-
win is a meteorologist and Erwin says that it is going to rain to-
night, and if this is a statement within meteorology, then it is 
going to rain tonight.” However, if Scheme 2 had been adopted, 
the connection premise would read “If Erwin is a meteorologist, 
and Erwin says that it is going to rain tonight, and this is a 
statement within meteorology, and Erwin is unbiased in this re-
spect, then it is going to rain tonight.” 
 
3.4 Profiting from adopted argumentation schemes 
 
Krabbe makes a distinction between three types of concessions 
(2001), which can also be made to apply to the ways one may be 
committed to an argumentation scheme. A participant can accept 
a proposition as a free concession, meaning that she can retract 
her commitment to it without incurring any further obligations 
from retracting it. A plausible way in which a free concession 
can be incurred is by refraining from challenging a statement by 
the other side. An argumentation scheme can also be the object 
of a free commitment. For example as a result of a participant’s 
choice to refrain from challenging the connection premise of an 
instance of the scheme at hand. Next, a participant can accept a 
proposition as a fixed concession within a particular dialogue, 
meaning that she cannot retract her commitment to it within the 
confines of this very dialogue. A fixed concession can be in-
curred by explicitly tying oneself down to a proposition or to an 
argumentation scheme. Lastly, a participant can accept a propo-
sition, or an argumentation scheme, as a presumption, meaning 
that she can retract her commitment to it, be it that she incurs 
special obligations by doing so. Entering a dialogue within a 
particular institutional context can be seen as entailing presump-
tive commitments that characterize that institutional context. 
Even a philosophical skeptic is presumed to accept that he has a 
physical body at his athletics club. And by agreeing, as a politi-
cian, to participate in a parliamentary inquiry into the causes of 
the financial crisis, one cannot, during that meeting, retract 
one’s commitment to arguments from authority,5 without chang-
ing that kind of a meeting into quite a different kind of meeting. 
A commitment to a presumption involves special obligations 
when challenging, and thereby retracting commitment to it.  
When the opponent challenges a presumption, the propo-
nent may always demand the opponent to explain her challenge, 
or demand her to defend the appropriateness of her challenge 
(see Van Laar and Krabbe 2012 on the opponent’s “burden of 
criticism”). An explanatory motivation of why a presumption 
has been withdrawn involves advancing counterconsiderations, 
by which the speaker makes it clear to the interlocutor why she 
is critical and how she considers her critical position to be a ten-
able position. A defense of the appropriateness of challenging a 
presumption, which has been labeled a validation and an argued 
challenge (Van Laar and Krabbe 2012), involves giving argu-
mentation, at a metalevel of dialogue, in favor of the appropri-
ateness of the retraction of the presumption, for example by re-
ferring to changed circumstances. However, in response to an 
opponent’s mere challenge of a presumption P, a request by the 
proponent for counterargumentation—that is, an argument by 
the opponent in favor of the denial of P—would amount to a 
Straw Man Fallacy. Only if the retraction of the presumption is 
                                                 
5
 Of course, one must at least accept some version of an argument scheme 
with which an appeal to authority can be made, but not necessarily all ver-
sions of such argument schemes. 
conveyed through the rejection (strong denial) of it, it would be 
legitimate to request for genuine counterargumentation. 
There is an important difference between an explanatory 
motivation and a validation. In both cases, to meet the burden of 
criticism, the opponent puts forward reasoning. What makes 
these speech acts different is that the explanation may succeed 
even though the reasoning does not start from propositions that 
the proponent has conceded. In the case of validation, the oppo-
nent is putting forward argumentation, and in order to succeed 
she must start from propositions conceded by the proponent. 
This is also the case in counterargumentation, but now she is 
defending a proposition at a meta-level. To be more specific, she 
is defending a proposition about the legitimacy of her previous 
move of challenging the connection premise.  
In order to elaborate on explanatory motivations, the no-
tion of a counterconsideration must be dealt with in some more 
detail. A counterconsideration can be approached from the per-
spective of giving an explanatory motivation, but it can also be 
approached from the perspective of giving strategic advice. 
First, a counterconsideration can be seen as revealing to the 
proponent how the opponent’s critical stance towards the main 
standpoint is a tenable position, in spite of her commitments. 
The opponent may explain her critical stance towards the con-
nection between Erwin’s making his forecast and the correctness 
of the forecast by informing the proponent that she reckons, for 
instance, with the possibility that Erwin is making a mistake as a 
result of a lack of sleep. Second, a counterconsideration can be 
seen as revealing to the proponent how he should go about in his 
attempts to convince the opponent of his standpoint. Applied to 
our example: The proponent is advised to refute that Erwin 
might be making a mistake as a result of a lack of sleep, or to 
show that this possibility is far-fetched and need not be taken 
seriously. The opponent may stress either of these two perspec-
tives when presenting her counterconsideration. She may stress 
the explanatory perspective, saying: “Why would we expect rain 
on account of Erwin’s say-so? As far as you’ve shown, Erwin 
might be making a mistake as a result of a lack of sleep.” Or, 
she could stress the perspective of strategic advice: “Why rain?; 
Can you exclude the possibility that Erwin was making a mis-
take as a result of a lack of sleep?” In other words, a counter-
consideration is a proposition that is put forward in order to both 
explain how the opponent takes her critical position to be a ten-
able position and to provide the proponent with information 
about how to proceed in his attempts at defending his position. 
Offering a counterconsideration does not need to involve a 
(conditional) burden of proof. The opponent’s counterconsidera-
tion can be put forward with the illocutionary force that Rescher 
called “cautious assertion.” When the opponent utters P as a 
cautious assertion, she expresses the message that “P is the case 
for all that you (the adversary) have shown” or “P’s being the 
case is compatible with everything you’ve said (i.e., have main-
tained or conceded)” (Rescher 1977, p. 6). Although a counter-
consideration can also be asserted more strongly, such that the 
opponent must argue in favor of its correctness if asked to do so 
by the proponent, I shall assume in the remainder of this paper, 
that the opponent refrains from adopting a standpoint herself, 
and restricts herself to critically test whatever the proponent puts 
forward. In these situations, counterconsiderations are cautious-
ly asserted and do not involve a burden of proof. Still, as we 
shall see, they can be successful in undermining the application 
of an acceptable argumentation scheme.  
 Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008) discuss the problem of 
how an argumentation scheme can be binding, given that in-
stances of argumentation schemes can be defeated. The twofold 
solution of the problem that I adopt here is the following (see 
also van Laar 2012). (a) If an argument instantiates an argumen-
tation scheme that has been adopted by the opponent as a fixed 
commitment or a presumption, then the connection premise of 
that argument can always be treated as a presumption, that is, as 
a proposition that can only be challenged by incurring the obli-
gation to provide an explanation or a validation, if so requested 
by the proponent. The reason that in these cases the connection 
premise is not a fixed concession is that argumentation schemes 
are by definition non-deductive schemes. The reason that the 
connection premise is not merely a free concession or not even a 
concession at all is that the proponent’s decision to use this spe-
cific argument - that instantiates this very argumentation scheme 
- is plausibly based upon the presence of the opponent’s initial 
commitment to the argumentation scheme at hand. (b) If an ar-
gument instantiates an argumentation scheme that has not been 
adopted by the opponent, or merely as a free concession, then 
the connection premise must either be seen as not being a com-
mitment of the opponent, or as merely a free concession. If, in 
the second case, the opponent challenges the connection prem-
ise, she simply retracts her free concession. In other words, if 
the argumentation scheme is not a commitment it is not binding, 
and if it is a free concession, it is hardly binding.  
In order to clarify this position, I shall elaborate further on 
the Erwin case. Suppose the opponent is committed, either as a 
fixed concession or as a presumption, to the argumentation 
scheme from authority that was labeled Scheme 1: “Person E is 
an expert in field F; Person E says that P; P is a proposition 
within field F; Therefore P.” Suppose, further, that the propo-
nent has put forward the following argument: “Erwin is a mete-
orologist; Erwin says that it is going to rain tonight; That it’s 
going to rain tonight is a meteorological statement; Therefore it 
is going to rain tonight.” Then, according to this view, the oppo-
nent is committed to the following connection premise as a pre-
sumption: “If Erwin is a meteorologist and Erwin says that it’s 
going to rain tonight, and that it’s going to rain tonight is a me-
teorological statement, then it is going to rain tonight.” Given 
the status of this connection premise as a presumption, the op-
ponent is allowed to challenge it, but she must then, upon the 
proponent’s request, provide a validation for this challenge, 
which is an argument for the thesis that challenging, and thereby 
retracting commitment to, this presumption is, within the con-
text at hand, a legitimate move. For example, she might allege 
that Dutch meteorologists have a bad track record, which defeats 
the use of authority arguments in this special context, Erwin be-
ing Dutch. In addition, after having challenged this presumptive 
connection premise, the opponent must, upon the proponent’s 
request, provide an explanation of her challenge of the connec-
tion premise. For example, she might state that she reckons with 
the possibility that Erwin is making a mistake, possibly as a re-
sult of lack of sleep, or of a neurological disorder, or she might, 
again, put the quality of Dutch meteorology into question.  
If the opponent provides such an explanation for her posi-
tion of critical doubt towards the proponent’s connection prem-
ise, she merely provides a counterconsideration that she does not 
need to defend on the proponent’s request, but that the propo-
nent should refute in order to make the opponent withdraw her 
critical stance towards the connection premise. More in detail, if 
the opponent provides W as her explanation of her critical doubt 
towards the connection premise, she thereby provides the pro-
ponent with the strategic advice to either (a) defend not-W, or 
(b) to defend that W does not refute the connection premise, or 
(c) to show that W points at a possible situation in which, admit-
tedly the proponent’s premises are true and the conclusion false, 
but that is in the context at hand far-fetched and unrealistic. 
Therefore, if the opponent provides such an explanation, she is 
not defending a standpoint of her own. The opponent can defeat 
the proponent’s argument without advancing any genuine argu-
ment (cf. Pollock 1995).  
To summarize this view, argumentation schemes are con-
venient devices for proponents, for if the opponent is committed 
to a scheme as a fixed concession or as a presumption, this im-
plies the further, presumptive commitment to the sufficiency of 
the justificatory force of any argument that instantiates that ar-
gumentation scheme. The opponent’s criticism of the justificato-
ry force of such an argument comes at the expense of having to 
provide explanatory counterconsiderations or even a validation, 
if requested. If the proponent applies an argumentation scheme 
that has not been adopted by the opponent or merely adopted as 
a free concession, or if he employs an argument without clearly 
instantiating any identifiable argumentation scheme, the oppo-
nent may choose to challenge the connection premise without 
incurring any such obligation to explain or validate her posi-
tion.
6
 Non-deductive argumentation schemes can be incorpo-
rated in a dialogue theory in a way that does not mitigate the 
basic dialectical division of labor.  
 
3.5 How to make the passage from premises to conclusion ac-
ceptable? 
 
How can an opponent criticize an instance of an adopted argu-
mentation scheme, and how can a proponent make the passage 
from premises to conclusion acceptable? In other words: how 
can the participants determine whether an adopted argumenta-
tion scheme has been applied correctly? Instead of imposing on 
the participants a fixed list of critical questions, the contending 
parties themselves can fix the procedural arrangement for testing 
the quality of arguments. If the parties go about in a more or less 
systematic way, they can agree on testing both the acceptability 
of each of the regular premises of the argument, whether made 
explicit by the proponent or left implicit, and the acceptability of 
the connection premise (often left implicit).
7
 As we have seen in 
Section 3.3, what counts as a regular premise and what counts as 
the connection premise depends upon the choice of the specific 
argumentation schemes in a preliminary stage.  
The participants can choose to test the acceptability of 
each of these premises with various kinds of critical reactions. 
They can request for an argument of a statement with so-called 
“pure challenges” (Krabbe 2007, p. 56), “Why S?” – for exam-
ple: “How are you going to convince me that Erwin is a meteor-
ologist?” They can choose to add a counterconsideration to the 
challenge, such as “As far as I have heard, Erwin never has 
made a serious study of meteorology,” that explains why the op-
ponent is not yet accepting the premise, thus turning the pure 
                                                 
6
 Nevertheless, it would be instrumental for the resolution process if she does 
convey her motives for challenging the connection premise, for the reason 
that it assists the proponent in developing a persuasive strategy. In other 
words, if the connection premise is not a presumptive commitment, it would 
be legitimate for the opponent to refuse to provide further explanation or val-
idation, even though providing counterconsiderations can be expected to im-
prove the quality of the exchange, thus going beyond what is strictly required 
for conflict resolution. 
7
 Cf. Wagemans (2011) for a systematic approach to critical questions per-
taining to arguments that appeal to expert opinions. 
challenge into a “bound challenge” (Krabbe 2007, p. 56). Or, a 
premise can be tested by strongly denying
8
 it, “Erwin certainly 
is not a meteorologist,” possibly accompanied by counterargu-
mentation, “for Erwin makes elementary blunders in his fore-
casts.” Each of these reactions imply, or at least prepare for, a 
negative evaluation of the proposition at issue, thereby making 
the reaction a “critical reaction” (see Krabbe and Van Laar 2011 
for the various “ways of criticism”). 
 Of course, the connection premise of the argument is no 
exception: it can be critically reacted to with a request for argu-
ment, possibly accompanied by a counterconsideration, or by 
way of a strong denial, possibly accompanied by counterargu-
mentation. As we have seen, even a pure challenge involves a 
burden of criticism, if the connection premise happens to be a 
presumption 
In the remainder of this paper, I restrict my attention to di-
alogues in which the opponent advances a pure challenge and 
offers an explanatory counterconsideration upon the proponent’s 
request. Thus, I leave validations and counterargumentations 
aside. In the dialogue system of the next section, the fragment of 
dialogue that ensues from advancing an explanatory countercon-
sideration against a connection premise is labeled a refutation 
dialogue. In a refutation dialogue, three issues can be expected 
to surface: can the proponent show to the opponent that the 
counterconsideration is false?; can he show that the explanatory 
counterconsideration is insufficient to defeat the connection 
premise?; and can he show that the counterconsideration is far-
fetched and unrealistic and need not to be taken into account? 
The rules are such that the winner of the refutation dialogue 
wins the dialogue as a whole. 
When has the proponent defended his argument convinc-
ingly, as far as the connection premise is concerned? The answer 
is that the opponent must have an unconditional right to put for-
ward counterconsiderations, showing in some detail how she 
considers the conclusion worthy of critical doubt even if she 
were to accept the premises. The judgment whether or not the 
opponent succeeds in advancing a realistic counterconsideration 
should be “in the hand of the participants themselves.” The pro-
ponent has defended his connection premise successfully, if for 
each counterconsideration put forward, he has been able (a) to 
refute it by defending its falsity or by defending the insufficien-
cy of the counterconsideration to undermine the connection 
                                                 
8
 Krabbe and Van Laar (2011) make a distinction between strong denials, by 
which one incurs a conditional burden of proof, and weak denials, that mere-
ly express that the proposition denied has not yet been convincingly argued 
for and moreover expresses the expectation that no convincing argument for 
it will be forthcoming.  
premise, or (b) to show that the counterconsideration does not 
convey a sufficiently realistic counterexample.
9
 
 The following example illustrates the dialectic. 
 
1. Proponent: It is going to rain tonight. [Standpoint] 
2. Opponent: Why so? [Pure challenge] 
3. Proponent: Erwin is a meteorologist, and Erwin says that it is 
going to rain tonight, and this is a statement within meteorol-
ogy. Therefore, it is going to rain tonight. [Argument that, in 
this context, clearly instantiates the adopted Scheme 1] 
4. Opponent: Why (If Erwin is a meteorologist, and Erwin says 
that it is going to rain tonight, and this is a statement within 
meteorology, then it is going to rain tonight)? [Pure chal-
lenge of the connection premise] 
5. Proponent: This is what you’re presumed to have accepted on 
account of your acceptance of Scheme 1. Explain! [Request 
for explanation] 
6. Opponent: Erwin might be confused, as a result of his old age. 
[Counterconsideration 1, that starts a refutation dialogue] 
7. Proponent: No, he is still widely esteemed by his colleagues. 
[Refutation by showing the falsity of counterconsideration 1] 
8. Opponent: But, nobody likes rain! [Counterconsideration 2] 
9. Proponent: It’s false that if nobody likes rain, Erwin’s predic-
tion doesn’t hold water. [Refutation by showing the insuffi-
ciency of counterconsideration 2] 
10. Opponent: Okay, I stand corrected. But then, his employer 
might have put him under pressure to come up with this very 
prediction. [Counterconsideration 3] 
11. Proponent: You know that’s nonsense. [Statement to the ef-
fect that counterconsideration 3 does not yield a sufficiently 
realistic counterexample to the argument] 
12. Opponent: Yeah, you’re right. I give up! [Acceptance of the 
connection premise, and also of the standpoint.] 
 
Thus, an argument can be accepted by the opponent as a proper 
instance of an adopted argumentation scheme when all of her 
counterconsiderations have been refuted or shown to be unreal-
istic. This procedural arrangement enables the parties, in a situa-
tion where the argument at hand instantiates an argumentation 
scheme that governs the dialogue, to come to an agreement as to 
                                                 
9
 According to the view adopted in this paper, the opponent need not provide 
an argument in order to convince the proponent that the counterconsideration 
is realistic. Although this feature has not been implemented in the formal 
system presented in Section 4.2, the proponent must be the one who has the 
obligation to show that the counterconsideration is unrealistic. The reason, 
again, being that it is he who is convincing the opponent that her critical posi-
tion is untenable. 




4.  Modeling argumentation schemes in dialogue systems 
In this section, I develop a formal dialectical system, called 
“Asymmetrical Why-because System for Argumentation 
schemes”, AWSA. This system resembles Hamblin’s formal 
system called “Why-Because system with questions” (1970, 
Chapter 8) at some points, but it also diverges from it in a num-
ber of ways.  
AWSA is asymmetric. Dialectic is characterized by a divi-
sion of labor, according to which there is a defending party and 
a critical party (cf. Rescher on probative asymmetries, 1977, p. 
17-18). There is some reason to doubt that Hamblin’s system 
implements such a division of labor. First, in Hamblin’s dia-
logues a party cannot win or lose the dialogue. Second, the rules 
of Hamblin’s system apply to both parties, who are referred to 
as “Black” and “White” rather than as, for example, “Opponent” 
and “Proponent.” Nevertheless, at a local level there is a clear 
division of labor, in so far as the argumentative exchanges are 
concerned. In the “Why-Because system with questions,” a re-
quest for argumentation “Why S?” does not involve any com-
mitment, while, instead arguments are made up from statements 
which do involve commitments and consequently must be de-
fended against criticism. The idea of this paper is that this argu-
mentative asymmetry can be upheld, also when presumptions 
and defeasible reasoning with argumentation schemes are con-
cerned. 
I shall start by developing an “Asymmetrical Why-
because System”, AWS, that forms a simplified version of 
Hamblin’s system in which the options of posing questions and 
of retracting commitments have been left out. The idea is that 
the participants can adopt deductive logical schemes, but not 
defeasible argumentation schemes. AWS has been made explic-
itly asymmetrical by having a proponent and an opponent with 
distinct tasks. The proponent is defending a thesis, throughout 
the entire dialogue, by attempting to show that the opponent’s 
critical attitude towards his thesis makes the opponent’s position 
untenable. The opponent is critically challenging the thesis and 
the defense offered in favor of it, in an attempt to show that her 
critical position is tenable after all. What is also different from 
Hamblin’s system, is that in a dialogue according to the rules of 
AWS, a party can win the dialogue after having completed its 
task. Finally, the system is made less permissive by enforcing 
each move to be relevant to the issue with which the discussion 
starts. Relevance is enforced by limiting challenges to be fo-
cused only on the proponent’s thesis or on part of his argument, 
as well as by making all arguments respond to the challenges of 
the opponent. 
 After having stated AWS, I shall continue by revising and 
adding rules that are needed to accommodate the use of argu-
mentation schemes, instead of deductive schemes. This will be 
done by: (a) giving the proponent the option to provide an ar-
gument that instantiates an adopted argumentation scheme; (b) 
by giving the opponent the option to challenge the premises, in-
cluding the connection premise, of such an argument; and (c) by 
making the parties responsible for deciding the issue of the ac-
ceptability of the connection premise by arguing over the ac-
ceptability, relevance, and realism of the opponent’s counter-
considerations.  
 
4.1 Asymmetrical Why-Because System (AWS) 
 
Locution Rules: 
The following are permissible locutions, where S, T, … denote 
atomic or complex sentences of a language that at least contains 
the logical connective .  
L1. Proponent may choose from the following moves: Thesis S; 
Argument {T, T S};
10
 I give up. 
L2. Opponent may choose from the following moves: Why S?; I 
give up. 
 
Commitment Rules  
C1. At a preliminary stage it has been decided what proposi-
tions, and what deductive logical schemes
11
 are part of Op-
ponent’s commitment store.12 
 
Structural Rules 
S1. The participants alternate and make one locution at a time. 
Proponent starts with “Thesis S.” 
                                                 
10
 In this system the connection premise is modeled as a material implication, 
although the expressed message is, as we have seen, more involved. An ar-
gument with several regular premises can be modeled by understanding these 
reasons as making up one conjunctive premise. 
11
 A similar feature of dialectical systems can be found in Mackenzie who 
enables the parties to choose “preferred valid argument schemata” (1990, p. 
570). 
12
 Only the commitments of the Opponent are collected in a commitment 
store. Of course, the Proponent also is committed to the propositions he as-
serts. However, the Proponent’s commitments at a certain stage can all easily 
be read from his previous dialogue moves. 
S2. A move “Thesis S” is followed by “Why S?” or by “I give 
up.” 
S3. “Why S?” is followed by “Argument {T, T S}” or “I give 
up.” 
S4. A move “Argument {T, T S}” is followed by either “Why 
T?” or “Why T S?” or “I give up.” 
S5. A move “Why S?” is not allowed if S is part of Opponent’s 






W1. If a participant makes the move “I give up”, he loses the 
discussion and the other participant wins it.” 
 
4.2 Asymmetrical Why-Because System for Argumentation 
Schemes (AWSA) 
 
Structural Rule S5 cannot be revised merely by replacing “de-
ductive logical scheme” with “argumentation scheme.” For the 
parties can accept argumentation schemes as having justificatory 
force without accepting them as deductive, and allow instances 
of these schemes to get defeated with newly introduced infor-
mation. Therefore, AWSA will be developed in line with the 
considerations of Section 3 by giving the proponent to right to 
request for a counterconsideration when the opponent challenges 
the connection premise of an argument that instantiates an 
adopted argumentation scheme. Given that the emphasis in this 
paper is on the dialectic of non-deductive argumentation 
schemes, I refrain from dealing with presumptive commitments 
other than to the content of connection premises. In order to 
simplify matters further, attention shall be restricted to explana-
tory counterconsiderations, while leaving out the rights and ob-
ligations pertaining to validations and counterargumentations.  
 
Locution Rules: 
The following are permissible locutions, where S, T, … denote 
atomic or complex sentences of a language that at least contains 
the logical constants  and .  
L1. Proponent may choose from the following moves: Thesis S; 
Argument {T, T S}; Refutation S; Explain (Why S?); Un-
realistic!; I give up. 
L2. Opponent may choose from the following moves: Why S?; 
Counter S; I give up.  
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 Thus, Opponent is not allowed to utter “Why (If (if P then Q and not-Q), 
then not-P)?” if modus tollens has been accepted as a deductive logical 
scheme. 
 Definition: 
The move “Counter S” and all moves that follow upon it in the 
dialogue are said to be part of the refutation dialogue. 
 
Commitment Rules 
C1. At a preliminary stage it has been decided what propositions 
are part of Opponent’s commitment store. 
C2. At a preliminary stage it has been decided what argumenta-
tion schemes are part of Opponent’s commitment store, such 
that both participants recognize for each connection premise 
whether or not it instantiates the associated conditional of 
one of these adopted argumentation schemes.
14
 
C3. If Proponent uses an argument that instantiates an adopted 
argumentation scheme, then its connection premise becomes 
part of the Opponent’s commitment store, where it is 
marked as a presumption. 
C4. After a move “Why S?”, S is no longer an element of Oppo-
nent’s commitments store (if it happened to be there). 
 
Structural Rules 
S1. The participants alternate and make one locution at a time. 
Proponent starts with “Thesis S.” 
S2. A move “Thesis S” is followed by “Why S?” or by “I give 
up.” 
S3. “Why S?” is followed by “Argument {T, T S}”, or by “I 
give up”, or, in case both S is a commitment that is marked 
as a presumption (and consequently a connection premise of 
the form V U), and “Why S?” is not part of a refutation 
dialogue,
15
 by “Explain (Why V U?)”. 
S4. A move “Argument {T, T  S}” is followed by either “Why 
T?” or “Why T S?”, or by “I give up,” or, if “Argument 
{T, T  S}” is part of a refutation dialogue, by “Counter U.” 
S5. “Explain (Why V U?)” is followed by “Counter W” or by 
“I give up.”  
S6. “Counter W”, when offered in a refutation dialogue that was 
prompted by a move “Explain (Why V U?),” is followed 
by “Refutation W”, or by “Refutation (W (V U)”, 
or by Unrealistic!, or by “I give up.” 
                                                 
14
 For example, the associated conditional of Scheme 1 reads: “If Person E is 
an expert in field F and if Person E says that P and if P is a proposition within 
field F, then P”.  
15
 The model can be extended by enabling Proponent to request for an expla-
nation of a challenge of a presumption within a refutation dialogue, which 
may lead to the embedding of refutation dialogues within refutation dia-
logues. 
S7. A move “Refutation W” (or: “Refutation 
(W (V U)”) by Proponent is followed by “I give up” 
or by “Counter X”, or by “Why W?” (or: “Why 
(W (V U)?” ). 
S8. Proponent’s move “Unrealistic” is followed by “Counter S,” 
or by “I give up.” 
S9. A move “Why S?” is not allowed if S is part of Opponent’s 
commitment store but not marked as a presumption. 
S10. It is not allowed to make the move “Counter S” if the move 
“Counter S” has been made before. 
 
Win-Loss rules 
W1. If a participants makes the move “I give up”, he loses the 
discussion and the other participant wins it. 
 
The example from Section 3.6 can now be formalized in the fol-
lowing way: 
 
  Move Commentary 
1 Prop. Thesis S S = It is going to rain next week 
2 Opp. Why S?  
3 Prop. Argument {T, 
T S} 
T = Erwin is a meteorologist, and 
Erwin says that it is going to rain 
tonight, which is a statement within 
meteorology 
4 Opp. Why T S? Assuming that Proponent’s argu-
ment instantiated an adopted argu-
mentation scheme, Opponent chal-
lenges, and thereby retracts, a pre-
sumption. 
5 Prop. Explain (Why 
T S?) 
 
6 Opp. Counter W W = Erwin might be confused, due 
his old age 
7a Prop. Refutation W  
7b Opp. Why W? A move left implicit, but anticipated 
by Proponent 
7c Prop. Argument {X, 
X W} 
X = He is still esteemed by his col-
leagues 
8 Opp. Counter Y Y = Nobody likes rain 




10 Opp. Counter Z Z = His employer might have put 
him under pressure 
11 Prop. Unrealistic!  
12 Opp. I give up  
 
Note that “Counter W” has no direct consequences for the 
commitment stores of any of the parties. More specifically, the 
proponent does not have the option to make the opponent defend 
W. This represents the idea that a counterconsideration merely 
conveys a possibility to be refuted by the proponent, rather than 
a statement to be defended by the opponent. Still, the counter-
consideration goes much further than posing a mere critical 
question, such as “Why S?”, by introducing a piece of infor-
mation W that, if not refuted by the proponent by getting W or 
(W  (V U) accepted (with V U being the connection 
premise under attack), would defeat the proponent’s argument. 
According to these rules, the discussion about the accepta-
bility or refutatory sufficiency of these counterconsiderations 
decides the discussion as a whole. Given that also the partici-
pants can themselves choose what argumentation schemes to 
adopt, within some preliminary stage of the dialogue, Hamblin’s 
Justificatory Force Principle has been satisfied. His Dialectical 
Meaning Principle can be seen as satisfied in so far as the mean-
ing of the notion of argumentation scheme as well as the mean-
ing of a particular argumentation scheme, such as a particular 
kind of argument from authority, is provided by the dialogical 
procedures specified in the rules. The model AWSA can be en-
riched in various directions, as we have seen along the way.  
The system AWSA differs in an important respect from the 
Hamblin-style dialogue system ASD that has been proposed by 
Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008). In ASD, the opponent must 
provide an argument that the case is exceptional, if she chal-
lenges the connection premise on that account (pp. 388-389). 
AWSA, however, accommodates defeaters in a way that does 
not interfere with the dialectical division of labor.  
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, it has been shown how defeasible argumentation 
schemes, which were not explicitly dealt with by Hamblin, can 
be implemented in a dialogue system that closely resembles 
Hamblin’s own system “Why-Because system with questions”, 
and that, moreover, implements the principles that characterize 
his dialectical philosophy: the Dialectical Meaning Principle and 
the Dialectical Evaluation Principle, and more in particular his 
Justificatory Force Principle. The result can be seen as a way to 
specify, what van Eemeren and Grootendorst have called, the 
“intersubjective testing procedure” with which to determine 
whether an argumentation scheme has been applied correctly 
(2004, Chapter 6). 
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